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THE NEXT STEP IN CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 
REFORM: PASSING THE CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 
REFORM ACT OF 2014 
Daniel Reed+ 
One of our most cherished notions as American citizens is that our private 
property should be secure.1  People should not have their property taken away 
without due process of law, and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution 
codifies this fundamental principle.2  Considering the importance of private 
property in our society,3 the American people might assume that the federal 
government would do everything in its power to uphold basic property rights.  
However, in the murky world of civil asset forfeiture, this is not the case. 
Consider the story of Lyndon McLellan: an average citizen and convenience 
store owner living in North Carolina.4  Acting on the advice of his local bank 
teller, he kept his deposits of convenience store profits below $10,000 to save 
his bank burdensome paperwork.5  He could not have predicted that his well-
intentioned act would get him into trouble with the United States Government.6 
In July 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seized all $107,702.66 of 
McLellan’s bank account without notice, accusing him of unlawfully 
“structuring” deposits to avoid reporting requirements.7  Despite never being 
charged with a crime, McLellan suffered a protracted legal battle.8  After ten 
grueling months and the intervention of a public interest law firm, the IRS finally 
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 1. ROGER PILON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: EUROPE AND 
AMERICA 3–4 (2008), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/pilon_031009.pdf. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  A person shall not be “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” Id. 
 3. See PILON, supra note 1, at 1–2, 7–8 (discussing private property rights under the 
Constitution and the importance attached to such rights by the Framers). 
 4. Jason Pye, This Business Owner Fought IRS Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Forced 
the Government to Return $107,000 of Wrongfully Seized Cash, FREEDOMWORKS (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.freedomworks.org/content/business-owner-fought-irs-abuse-civil-asset-forfeiture-
and-forced-government-return-107000. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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returned his money.9  Unfortunately, McLellan’s story is far more common than 
one might expect. 
Thousands of forfeiture cases are prosecuted annually in the United States and 
frequently involve owners who have not been charged with a crime in 
connection to the forfeited property.10  Such forfeitures are known as “civil asset 
forfeitures” (or “civil forfeitures”) because the proceedings are non-criminal and 
are considered to be against the property in rem rather than against the owner as 
a defendant. 11   Civil asset forfeiture can be greatly effective when taking 
property from criminal organizations and depriving people with unclean hands 
from benefitting from illegal activity. 12   Unfortunately, the lax regulations 
surrounding civil asset forfeiture have created an environment where abuse can 
thrive, with law enforcement often pursuing civil forfeitures out of inappropriate 
financial motivations. 13   As a result, many innocent people have found 
themselves caught in a dragnet originally intended to repurpose the assets of 
hardened criminals and scofflaws.14 
With stories of questionable forfeitures becoming commonplace in the news, 
some members of Congress took notice of the inadequate protections offered 
under current civil asset forfeiture laws.  On July 28, 2014, Representative Tim 
Walberg (R-MI) introduced a bill titled the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
of 2014 (CAFRA 2014).15  The Act proposes some important changes to federal 
civil asset forfeiture laws, including raising the burden of proof, expanding 
                                                        
 9. Id. 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 101 
(2007), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/nmls.pdf.  A 
report from the Department of the Treasury noted that in fiscal year 2004 the Department of Justice 
filed 3,785 criminal asset forfeiture cases and 2,235 civil forfeiture cases.  See Eric Blumenson & 
Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 
48–49 (1998) (“There is no constitutional requirement that the property owner be at fault, or be 
prosecuted for the underlying criminal activity.”). 
 11. Jennifer Levesque, Property Rights - When Reform Is Not Enough: A Look Inside the 
Problems Created by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 59, 
65–66 (2015).  An action in rem is “an action determining the title to property and the rights of the 
parties, not merely among themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest 
in that property; a real action.”  See Action in Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
In rem translated from Latin means “against a thing.”  Id. at In Rem. 
 12. Rachel L. Stuteville, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law Enforcement Has 
Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of Local 
Government – The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is On, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1178–79 (2014). 
 13. Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility – The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1046, 
1073–74 (2002) (discussing several flaws in current civil asset forfeiture laws and the government’s 
financial motivation in civil forfeiture cases). 
 14. HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM 
SEIZURE 5–6 (1995); see also Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access 
to Counsel and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 
(2001). 
 15. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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notice of the right to counsel, and broadening proportionality considerations.16  
However, it quickly became bogged down in Congressional inefficiency, and 
gathered dust on the shelf of the House Judiciary Committee for over three 
years.17  This Note will argue that CAFRA 2014 should pass because previous 
attempts at civil asset forfeiture reform have provided inadequate protection to 
the American people from civil forfeiture abuse. 
Of the previous forfeiture reforms, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000 (CAFRA 2000) had the most impact.18  CAFRA 2000 established some 
basic protections for property owners involved in forfeiture proceedings. 19  
Ultimately, however, it did not do enough to protect citizens from civil forfeiture 
abuse.20  CAFRA 2000’s burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, which is an inappropriately light standard for the government to 
prove.21  While the innocent owner defense is available, the burden of proof is 
improperly placed on the claimant to show that he or she is an innocent owner.22  
CAFRA 2000’s notice requirements, proportionality standards, and equitable 
sharing restrictions are all inadequate to afford individuals appropriate 
protection from forfeiture abuse.23 
After discussing the history of civil asset forfeiture, this Note analyzes 
CAFRA 2014 and examines its potential impact on the civil asset forfeiture 
process.  This Note then reviews some deficiencies with current federal civil 
forfeiture laws and will examine the proposed changes in CAFRA 2014.  After 
considering the positive impact that the proposed changes could have on civil 
asset forfeiture, this Note argues that Congress should pass CAFRA 2014 to 
provide beneficial reforms to federal civil asset forfeiture laws. 
I. FORFEITURE THROUGH THE AGES 
A.  From Exodus to the King’s Treasury 
The modern concept of civil asset forfeiture originated from an ancient legal 
fiction dating back to biblical times.24  A legal fiction exists when a fact is 
                                                        
 16. Id. 
 17. H.R. 5212 (113th): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5212 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983 (2012 & Supp. III 2016); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 1046, 
1073–74; see generally Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 19. §§ 981, 983. 
 20. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1046. 
 21. See Levesque, supra note 11, at 76–78. 
 22. Darpana M. Sheth, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Forfeiture Laws, 14 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 24, 27 (2013). 
 23. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014).  See 
discussion infra Part I.F–K. 
 24. See Isaiah M. Hunter, The War on Drugs and Taxes: How Tax Expenditure Analysis Can 
Shed Light on Civil Asset Forfeiture, 9 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 549, 551 (2015) (explaining that “civil 
asset forfeiture is rooted in the ancient legal fiction of the deodand,” which required property “used 
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assumed or created by an interpreting authority to justify a particular rule or 
operation of law.25  In the forfeiture context, an example of the legal fiction at 
work can be seen in the book of Exodus, which stated “when an ox gores a man 
or woman to death, the ox must be stoned; its flesh may not be eaten.  The owner 
of the ox, however, shall go unpunished.”26  The idea was that chattel involved 
in a harmful act against humans was guilty of an offense against God’s “divinely 
ordained hierarchy of creation,” and could subsequently be destroyed for crimes 
of “high treason.”27 
Medieval English scholars used biblical, Anglo-Saxon, and Roman traditions 
to create the first rudimentary forfeiture laws.28  Building on the pre-Norman 
conquest practice of “noxal surrender,” which involved the gift of an animal or 
object causing death or serious injury (known as a “bane”) to a victim’s family 
as compensation, 29  scholars developed the concept of the deodand.  The 
deodand, mistranslated from the Latin “deo dandum” meaning “given to God,” 
called for an object used in criminal conduct, or otherwise causing harm to a 
human, to be forfeited to the English crown.30  The Coroner’s Rolls of thirteenth-
century England provide examples of the deodand at work.31  One account from 
Bedfordshire mentioned a sword seized after the arrest of an armed robber in the 
village of Sudbury: “[t]he township of Sudbury came with the hue and arrested 
John the felon . . . The sword is worth [twelve] pence and it is delivered to the 
township of Sudbury.” 32   The Coroner’s Rolls regularly mentioned seized 
property that was forfeited to the crown, including such things as vessels holding 
                                                        
in [a] crime to be destroyed” on the grounds that it was “intrinsically evil”); Todd Barnet, Legal 
Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. 
L. REV. 77, 79–80 (2001) (citing PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL 
SCIENCE 81 (1975)) (discussing the nature of a legal fiction, including a quotation from Professor 
Olivier who stated “a legal fiction is an assumption of fact deliberately, lawfully, and irrebutably 
made contrary to the facts proven or probable in a particular case, with the object of bringing a 
particular legal rule into operation or explaining a legal rule, the assumption being permitted by 
law or employed in legal science.”). 
 25. See Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An assumption that 
something is true even though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal 
rule operates; specif., a device by which a legal rule or institution is diverted from its original 
purpose to accomplish indirectly some other object.”). 
 26. Exodus 21:28. 
 27. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, 
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 180–81 
(1973). 
 28. Id. at 181–82. 
 29. Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 237, 241 (2005). 
 30. Barnet, supra note 24, at 87. 
 31. See SELECT CASES FROM THE CORONERS’ ROLLS, A.D. 1265–1413 (Charles Gross ed., 
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1895). 
 32. Id. at 2.  To finish the story, the Coroners’ Rolls state that “the said John, Richard 
Herbert’s son, struck William the Shepard with a sword on the right side of his head and cut away 
a portion of the head with the brains and the right ear, so that he died forthwith on the said bridge.” 
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boiling substances that scalded people to death.33   The deodand could also 
include property unrelated to the cause of death of a victim, such as a lamb 
belonging to a murderer.34  The deodand continued throughout medieval and 
early-modern England,35 and vestiges of the concept followed British settlers to 
the United States,36 despite widespread antipathy towards the practice. 
B.  Forfeiture in the New Republic 
In light of some hated British practices—such as the granting of Writs of 
Assistance, which gave crown officials a commission on seized goods— 
forfeiture was a detested practice in the American colonies. 37   Despite 
philosophical opposition, civil asset forfeiture took hold in the United States in 
several forms out of practical necessity.38 
Admiralty law was one area where civil asset forfeiture was commonly used.39  
American legislatures grudgingly embraced civil asset forfeiture in this context 
as an important tool to combat maritime offenses and enforce customs laws.40  
One famous U.S. Supreme Court case involved the forfeiture of a Spanish pirate 
ship, The Palmyra.41  Justice Story, writing the opinion for the court, affirmed 
the use of forfeitures in rem to seize property without a corresponding conviction 
of the property owner. 42   Ship owners guilty of smuggling or piracy were 
                                                        
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (stating that 
“English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending objects used in violation of the 
customs and revenue laws—likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition 
and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer”); Finkelstein, supra 
note 27, at 170 (observing that the deodand continued to operate in England until it was statutorily 
abolished in 1846). 
 36. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (citing C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 
(1943)) (“Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies—
and later in the states during the period of Confederation—were exercising jurisdiction in rem in 
the enforcement of (English and local) forfeiture statutes . . . .”); see also J. W. Goldsmith, Jr., 
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (noting that although courts may question the 
propriety of asset forfeiture, “it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the 
country to be now displaced”). 
 37. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 10, at 75–76; Brant C. Hadaway, Executive Privateers: 
A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the 
Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 89 (2000). 
 38. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 39. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 344 (1813) (upholding the forfeiture of a 
ship’s cargo for violations of customs laws); Brent Skorup, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection 
from Excessive Fines in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 427, 433 (2012). 
 40. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 43 (1996); 
Barnet, supra note 24, at 91. 
 41. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1827). 
 42. Justice Story’s opinion entrenched the constitutional legitimacy of civil in rem forfeitures.   
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difficult to prosecute in person because they were often absent and far outside 
the court’s jurisdiction.43  As such, the ability to gain in rem jurisdiction over 
vessels and cargo was quite useful in fighting nautical crimes because a 
“suspicious vessel could be arrested and prosecuted by name by the government, 
and the law treated the ship as if it were a guilty person.”44 
C.  Bootleggers, Mules, and Automobiles 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, civil asset forfeiture was often 
applied to violations of liquor smuggling and tax evasion laws.45  In one amusing 
case, a North Carolina district court ordered the owner of two hired mules to 
forfeit them because they had been used without his knowledge to illegally 
transport liquor.46  Actions against bootleggers continued to be a major operation 
of civil asset forfeiture through the early twentieth century, particularly in 
conjunction with the rise of automobiles as forfeitable property.47  For example, 
in Van Oster v. Kansas,48 an owner lent her vehicle to a car dealership, that then 
lent it to a third party, who was caught illegally smuggling liquor inside the 
                                                        
He wrote: 
[T]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached 
primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum, or malum in 
se.  The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the Admiralty.  Many 
cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no 
accompanying penalty in personam.  Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture 
in rem and a personal penalty.  But in neither class of cases has it ever been decided that 
the prosecutions were dependent upon each other.  But the practice has been, and so this 
Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and 
wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam. 
Id. at 14–15.  This opinion remains an important reference for forfeiture law and has been cited by 
the Court in more recent opinions.  See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330–31 
(1998); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in 
U.S. Currency, No. 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 
U.S. 442, 446–47 (1996); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993); Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683–84 (1974). 
 43. Skorup, supra note 39, at 433.  The Palmyra, for example, was a Spanish ship sailing out 
of Puerto Rico.  Although it is unclear who exactly owned the ship, if the owner were located in 
Spain or elsewhere around the world one can easily imagine the difficulty of bringing him to trial 
in the United States.  See The Palymra, 25 U.S. at 3, 5–6. 
 44. Barnet, supra note 24, at 90. 
 45. See Dobbins’ Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1877) (finding that 
property of landowner who leased his distillery to an operator who subsequently committed tax 
fraud was forfeitable, regardless of the fact that the landowner was unaware of the fraud); LEVY, 
supra note 40, at 58–59. 
 46. United States v. Two Bay Mules, 36 F. 84, 84 (W.D.N.C. 1888). 
 47. See United States v. One Saxon Auto., 257 F. 251, 251 (4th Cir. 1919); Logan v. United 
States, 260 F. 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1919); Joel T. Kornfeld & Anthony A. De Corso, Uncivil 
Forfeitures: Skillful Practitioners Can Take Advantage of the Newly Available Remedies to Undo 
Unjustified Civil Forfeitures, 26 L.A. LAW. 39, 40 (2003). 
 48. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926). 
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vehicle.49  Although the owner challenged the forfeiture on the grounds that she 
had no knowledge of the third party’s behavior or intention, the Supreme Court 
upheld the forfeiture.50  Such bootlegger actions were common, and the use of 
civil asset forfeiture in this capacity remained prevalent up until the “War on 
Drugs” beginning in the 1970s.51 
D.  Forfeiture During the Drug Wars 
In the 1970s, the “War on Drugs,” as it is now called, propelled civil asset 
forfeiture from an intermittently used principle targeting bootleggers and tax-
evaders into a ubiquitous and controversial law enforcement weapon.52  When 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act passed in 1970, it 
gave law enforcement enhanced ability to seize property connected to drug 
crimes.53  In 1978, Congress amended the law to broaden the types of property 
subject to forfeiture.54  In 1984, Congress further amended the statute to include 
real property55 and eliminated the requirement that forfeited assets be placed in 
the U.S. Treasury Department’s general fund.56  This enabled law enforcement 
agencies to seize property for their own benefit, with much less oversight and 
supervision.57  Notorious cases of forfeiture abuse came to light, drawing public 
outcry and provoking action in Congress.58   Organizations from across the 
                                                        
 49. Id. at 466. 
 50. Id. at 468–69. 
 51. Passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in 1970 
dramatically increased the usage of civil asset forfeiture.  See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1616a (2012) 
(providing statutory authority for equitable sharing programs, which will be discussed later in this 
Note); 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 881 (2012) (providing statutory authority for federal asset forfeiture, 
including which types of property are subject to forfeiture); Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34. 
 52. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1045, 1049–1050 (discussing some of the changes to 
forfeiture laws resulting from the War on Drugs); Levesque, supra note 11, at 67–69 (observing 
that the changes brought “increased criticism over the state of the civil asset forfeiture laws”). 
 53. Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34. 
 54. The 1978 amendment added “moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things 
of value furnished . . . in exchange for a controlled substance [to be forfeited].”  Psychotropic 
Substances Act of 1978, S. 2399, 95th Cong. (1978) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
881(a)(6)(1994)).  See also GREGORY M. VECCHI & ROBERT T. SIGLER, ASSETS FORFEITURE: A 
STUDY OF POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE 46 (2001); Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34. 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); Johnson, supra note 13, at 1050. 
 56. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1050. 
 57. See generally Marian R. Williams et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 1, 6 (2010). 
 58. Several courts began to question whether the government was properly using civil asset 
forfeiture.  In one instance, the Seventh Circuit proffered a stinging rebuke of the government’s 
attempt to seize half a million dollars in cash from a restaurateur without probable cause.  United 
States v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that “as has likely 
been obvious from the tone of this opinion, we believe the government’s conduct in forfeiture cases 
leaves much to be desired”).  The Second Circuit also voiced concern over the conduct of forfeiture 
proceedings.  United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 
1992) (stating “we continue to be enormously troubled by the government’s increasing and virtually 
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political spectrum called for civil forfeiture reform and finally compelled 
Congress to act in the mid-1990s.59 
E.  Battle Lines in Congress 
Representative Henry Hyde (R. IL) led the effort that would eventually lead 
Congress to pass CAFRA 2000.60  In the mid-1990s, Rep. Hyde presided over 
several hearings before the House Judiciary Committee where witnesses 
testified about instances of civil forfeiture abuse and mismanagement of 
forfeiture funds. 61   Rep. Hyde voiced dissatisfaction with contemporary 
application of civil asset forfeiture laws, stating “civil asset forfeiture all too 
often punishes innocent persons . . . We need to reform these procedures so as 
to ensure fundamental fairness and due process rights.”62  He drafted and held 
hearings on House Bill 1916, titled “The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,” 
which proposed changes intended to curb abusive practices in civil asset 
forfeiture.63  The U.S. Department of Justice proposed a counter bill, differing 
in many respects to House Bill 1916.64  Representative—later Senator—Charles 
Schumer (D. NY) introduced House Bill 1745 in 1997, which was a version of 
the current administration’s bill.65  Several weeks later, Rep. Hyde introduced 
House Bill 1835, a more expansive version of his own bill.66  There was a 
                                                        
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those 
statutes.”). 
 59. Rulli, supra note 14, at 87 (observing that forfeiture reform was supported by “such 
diverse groups as the National Rifle Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American 
Civil Liberties Union . . .”). 
 60. Rep. Hyde led several hearings before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the 
abuses within the civil asset forfeiture system and was the preeminent congressional voice for 
forfeiture reform.  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1996).  Rep. Hyde was so incensed about civil asset forfeiture 
abuse that he wrote a book decrying the practice, calling it a “jurisprudential Frankenstein monster.”  
See HYDE, supra note 14, at 1. 
 61. See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. 1 (1996).  During the hearing, Representative Hyde 
interviewed a man named Willie Jones who had money for his lawn business seized at the airport 
despite the fact that he was never charged with a crime, after a ticket agent reported him for paying 
in cash, a behavior considered suspicious.  Id. at 12–14. 
 62. Id. at 3. 
 63. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 64. The records of the 1996 hearing contain a bill proposed by the administration with a 
section-by-section analysis.  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee 
on the Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. 42 (1996) (statement of Stefan D. Casella, Deputy 
Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).  
One major point of contention was that the DOJ wanted the preponderance of the evidence standard 
rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard.  See id. at 130–31. 
 65. The Forfeiture Act of 1997, H.R. 1745, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Stefan D. Casella, 
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government Forfeiture Authority and 
Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 98 (2001). 
 66. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1835, 105th Cong. (1997). 
2017] The Next Step in Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 941 
hearing and discussion over the two bills on June 11, 1997.67  Later that year, 
both sides formulated a compromise bill that incorporated elements of House 
Bill 1835 and House Bill 1745, but it did not pass.68  Finally, Rep. Hyde was 
able to get a revised version of his bill, House Bill 1658, passed in 1999.69  As 
tedious as it was to pass the bill in the House of Representatives, getting it 
through the Senate would also prove difficult. 
Senators Jeff Sessions (R. AL) and Schumer introduced Senate Bill 1707, a 
counter bill to House Bill 1658, which represented the administration’s position 
and was more disposed to law enforcement.70  Two other Senators, Orrin Hatch 
(R. UT) and Patrick Leahy (D. VT) “introduced another bill, [Senate Bill] 1931, 
that contained most of the reform provisions that were enacted as part of CAFRA 
[2000].”71  After debate on these two bills, Rep. Hyde agreed to a version of 
House Bill 1658 that incorporated elements of the two Senate bills.72  With Rep. 
Hyde’s endorsement, the “House passed the bill as passed by the Senate without 
further amendment.”73  After four years of intense negotiation on Capitol Hill, 
President Clinton signed a heavily revised bill into law, which became known 
as the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.74 
F.  Lingering Problems with CAFRA 2000 
CAFRA 2000, while undoubtedly a step in the right direction, did not do 
enough to protect the people from abusive asset forfeiture practices.75  The 
government continued to engage in questionable forfeitures and critics 
demanded further reforms.76  They alleged, among other things, that there were 
insufficient notice requirements that failed to adequately inform claimants of 
their rights.77 
                                                        
 67. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary on 
H.R. 1835, 105th Cong. 1–2, 61–62 (1997). 
 68. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Casella, 
supra note 65, at 99–100. 
 69. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999); Casella, supra 
note 65, at 101.  For a record of the debate, see 145 CONG. REC. H4851 (daily ed. June 24, 1999). 
 70. Casella, supra note 65, at 101–02. 
 71. Id. at 101. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 97, 101–02.  CAFRA 2000 was codified under 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). See 18 
U.S.C. § 983 (2012 & Supp. III 2016). 
 75. See Rulli, supra note 14, at 88 (“CAFRA [2000] does not alter the inherent conflict of 
interest that provides a powerful economic incentive for law enforcement authorities to overreach 
and to evade accountability with large sums of public monies.”). 
 76. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1045–46, 1052. 
 77. Levesque, supra note 11, at 69. 
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G.  Insufficient Notice Requirement 
The Supreme Court has held that a party must receive due process before 
property is taken, and in the civil forfeiture context, this includes notice of a 
proceeding and a fair opportunity to be heard. 78   CAFRA 2000’s notice 
provisions allow the government to delay sending notice to potential claimants 
for at least sixty days after seizing property.79  An additional concern is that, 
although CAFRA 2000 provides for reduced rate or free legal representation 
under some circumstances, there is no requirement that the government must 
provide notice of that fact to interested parties.80  Since the government has no 
obligation to inform claimants of the potential right to counsel, forfeitures are 
frequently uncontested or challenged on a pro se basis. Without the assistance 
of a lawyer, indigent or uneducated claimants often lack time or resources to 
devote to the process.81  This is especially true when considering the strict filing 
deadlines in CAFRA 2000, which provides only thirty-five days to prepare a 
complaint.82 
The uncertainty associated with inadequate notice is exacerbated by the fact 
that appointment of counsel is discretionary in most civil asset forfeiture cases.83  
Courts have repeatedly distinguished civil matters from criminal cases in the 
Sixth Amendment context, emphasizing that there is no right to counsel in civil 
proceedings. 84   However, CAFRA 2000 contains one situation in which a 
claimant is absolutely entitled to legal aid.85  If forfeiture proceedings are against 
real property used as a “primary residence” by a claimant who is financially 
unable to obtain representation, then the court must appoint an attorney if the 
claimant requests one.86  However, this does little for a claimant who is unaware 
of this right, hence the need for a notice requirement.87  Many seizures are 
                                                        
 78. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i), (iv). 
 80. § 983(b)(1). 
 81. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 13; Levesque, supra note 11, at 88; see also HYDE, supra 
note 14, at 32. 
 82. The filing requirements mandated by CAFRA 2000 are somewhat rigorous.  A claimant 
must file a sworn claim “identify[ing] the specific property being claimed” and “stat[ing] the 
claimants interest in such property” within thirty–five days after receipt of a forfeiture notice. § 
983(a)(2)(B). 
 83. See Rulli, supra note 14, at 89 (“While the statute does not mandate this appointment of 
counsel, it does encourage courts to exercise their discretion to appoint counsel when the property 
owner has standing to contest the forfeiture and asserts a claim in good faith.”). 
 84. See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995), as 
amended (May 24, 1995) (holding that the Sixth Amendment applies exclusively to criminal 
proceedings, after an indigent defendant asserted his right to counsel in a civil forfeiture 
proceeding). 
 85. § 983(b)(2)(A). 
 86. Id.; see also United States v. 777 Greene Ave., 609 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 87. Rebecca Hausner, Adequacy of Notice Under CAFRA: Resolving Constitutional Due 
Process Challenges to Administrative Forfeitures, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1945–46 (2015). 
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uncontested because people are not adequately informed of forfeiture 
proceedings, are unsure of how to contest them, or are unaware of the ability to 
obtain free or reduced rate legal representation.88  Ultimately, the inadequate 
notice provisions in CAFRA 2000 contribute to a deck stacked against property 
owners in civil asset forfeiture cases.89 
H.  Light Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof in federal civil asset forfeiture cases is preponderance of 
the evidence.90  Preponderance of the evidence does not require the government 
to “demonstrate a direct connection between [d]efendant property and the illegal 
activity.”91  It only requires the government to demonstrate “that the existence 
of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”92  This means that 
even if a mere fifty-one percent of the evidence supports the property’s relation 
to illegal activity, then the property can be subject to forfeiture.93  The low 
evidentiary bar effectively allows the government to use the lack of obvious 
legitimacy as a substitute for evidence of illegitimacy.94  Although the Supreme 
Court has countered assertions that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in 
nature, 95  they undeniably possess essential connections to criminal law. 96  
Furthermore, the Court has admitted that civil forfeiture proceedings are 
                                                        
 88. Id. at 1932; see Eric Moores, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 777, 787 (2009) (observing that only twenty percent of property owners ever attempt to 
reclaim forfeited property). 
 89. Hausner, supra note 87, at 1932–33. 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). 
 91. United States v. $21,000 in U.S. Postal Money Orders and $785.00 in U.S. Currency, 298 
F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 92. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983). 
 93. See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“[Preponderance of the evidence] is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the jury is 
instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the 
edge may be.”). 
 94. United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that a claimant’s failure to prove that income was acquired by legitimate means was sufficient to 
support a forfeiture); United States v. $21,000 in U.S. Postal Money Orders and $785.00 in U.S. 
Currency, 298 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (observing that “unrebutted evidence of 
insufficient income does satisfy the government’s burden of proof in certain contexts”). 
 95. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in 
U.S. Currency, No 98-56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); see also United States v. 
8 Gilcrease Lane, 656 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 
267, 288, 290 (1996)). 
 96. All forfeitures must theoretically result from some sort of connection between property 
and illegal (criminal) activity.  In a criminal forfeiture proceeding, the forfeiture is a result of 
punishment for a criminal conviction.  A criminal conviction is not necessary in a civil forfeiture 
proceeding, but the government must meet the burden of proof that the property was connected to 
illegal activity.  See Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining both civil 
and criminal forfeitures). 
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partially intended to punish the owner regardless of guilt.97  Many innocent 
owners have had cash or other valuables seized under the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, simply because it was unusual or suspicious to carry large 
amounts of currency.98  The preponderance of the evidence standard is too easy 
for overzealous prosecutors to abuse, and does not create enough of a safeguard 
against frivolous forfeiture actions. 99   The Supreme Court has held that 
forfeitures are disfavored and should only be done in circumstances where they 
are “within both letter and spirit of the law.”100  Considering this admonishment, 
CAFRA 2000 leaves much to be desired regarding the burden of proof. 
I.  Inadequate Innocent Owner Defense 
CAFRA 2000 states that “an innocent owner’s interest in property shall not 
be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute” and places the burden on the 
claimant to prove by preponderance of the evidence that he or she is an innocent 
owner.101  However, the great deficiency of CAFRA 2000’s innocent owner 
defense is that it requires the claimant to exercise the burden of proof.102  Forcing 
a claimant to prove what he or she did not know is a fallacy; it is harder for an 
individual to prove that they did not know something than for the government 
to prove that they did.103  In the law’s current state, a claimant is effectively 
guilty until proven innocent, despite the ubiquitous principle in our justice 
system that a party is innocent until proven guilty.104  The Supreme Court has 
historically admitted that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature 
despite modern attempts to deny the punitive aspects of civil forfeiture laws.105  
                                                        
 97. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993). 
 98. United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 
United States v. $84,615 in U.S. Currency, 379 F.3d 496, 501–02 (8th Cir. 2004)) (holding that 
“possession of a large amount of cash is ‘strong evidence’ of a connection to drug activity”); 
United States v. $52,000.00, More or Less, in U.S. Currency, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (S.D. 
Ala. 2007). 
 99. HYDE, supra note 14, at 80–81; see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 1075–1079; Shaila 
Dewan, Law Lets I.R.S. Seize Accounts on Suspicion, No Crime Required, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/us/law-lets-irs-seize-accounts-on-suspicion-no-crime 
-required.html?_r=0. 
 100. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V–8 De Luxe Coach, Motor No. 18–3306511, 307 
U.S. 219, 226 (1939). 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2012). 
 102. Id. § 983(d). 
 103. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1059. 
 104. § 983(d)(1).  The statue requires a claimant to prove by preponderance of the evidence 
that they are an innocent owner.  But see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding 
“[t]he principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted 
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of 
our criminal law”). 
 105. Compare United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 293 (1996) (Kennedy J., concurring) 
(“Although there is language in our cases to the contrary . . . civil in rem forfeiture is not a 
punishment of the wrongdoer for his criminal offense.”), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in 
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Given this acknowledgement, it seems inequitable that the law forces a claimant 
to affirmatively assert innocence, rather than making the government meet the 
burden of proof. 
The Supreme Court has taken pains to emphasize that forfeiture serves as a 
deterrent, apart from its punitive nature.106  The Court has also denied that there 
is a constitutional right to an innocent owner defense.107  However, it does not 
seem reasonable to deter or punish a paradigmatic innocent owner, who is by 
definition not guilty.108  One of the only foreseeable “deterrent” effects is that 
people will be less willing to share or loan their property to others, lest the 
borrower commit an illegal act and subject the property to forfeiture.109 
J.  Disproportionate Forfeitures 
CAFRA 2000’s proportionality section states that the court “shall compare the 
forfeiture to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture,” but gives no 
further guidance on other proportionality concerns for the court to consider.110  
Lack of guidance on the scope of proportionality elements has led to unduly 
harsh forfeitures that undermine the interests of property owners.111 
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have been criticized for placing a severe 
burden on property owners, especially when the value of the forfeited property 
                                                        
U.S. Currency, No 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999), with One 1958 Plymouth 
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (stating “a forfeiture proceeding is quasi–criminal 
in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense 
against the law”), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–34 (1886) (holding “[w]e are also 
clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s 
property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their 
nature criminal”). 
 106. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996); see also Van Oster v. State of Kansas, 272 
U.S. 465, 467–68 (1926) (holding that the law “suggest[s] that certain uses of property may be 
regarded so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.  The law thus builds a 
secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity 
of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.”). 
 107. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446–47. 
 108. Innocent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining innocent as “[f]ree from 
guilt; free from legal fault”). 
 109. See generally Van Oster, 272 U.S. 465 (indicating that when a wrongdoer is “one intrusted 
[sic] by the owner with the possession and use of the offending vehicle,” the court need not inquire 
as to the state’s power to effect the seizure of the innocent owner’s property). 
 110. 18 U.S.C § 983(g)(2) (2012 & Supp. III 2016). 
 111. United States v. 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the residence 
of a mother of four was subject to forfeiture after drug activity occurred in the house and that such 
a punishment was not grossly disproportional); see also United States v. Lot Numbered One (1) of 
Lavaland Annex, 256 F.3d 949, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a motel could be forfeited, even 
if the corporation was not guilty of any crime) (“Admittedly there is no evidence that RMI [motel] 
was guilty of the criminal conduct described in these statutes. However, there is no dispute that the 
defendant property was used to conceal and otherwise facilitate the commission of those 
violations.”). 
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is disproportionate to the alleged criminal connection.112  The Supreme Court 
held in Austin v. United States113 that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
excessive fines applies to in rem civil forfeiture proceedings.114   This is in 
contrast to the Court’s long held, dubious assertion that civil forfeitures are 
remedial civil sanctions and are not inherently punitive.115  Notably, the Austin 
Court declined to articulate a test to determine what constitutes an excessive 
forfeiture.116 
In an attempt to provide clarity on the nature of an excessive forfeiture, the 
Supreme Court held in United States v. Bajakajian 117  that a forfeiture is 
unconstitutionally excessive if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a 
defendant’s offense.”118  Justice Thomas’s majority opinion noted that judicial 
measurements of the “gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently 
imprecise.”119  This is especially true in the context of civil asset forfeitures, 
when there may never be an underlying conviction for the court to consider.120  
In effect, the law requires courts to consider proportionality as a factor when 
determining the scope of forfeiture, but only so far as to “compare the forfeiture 
to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture.”121  As the law currently 
stands under CAFRA 2000, there is not enough of an impetus on the court to 
analyze forfeiture under multiple proportionality considerations. 
K.  Not So “Equitable” Sharing 
As CAFRA 2000 recognized, civil asset forfeiture is conducted at all levels 
of law enforcement, from small town police departments to federal agencies, 
                                                        
 112. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1060–61 (discussing some problems with the current 
jurisprudential approach to cases of disproportionate forfeiture, particularly in the context of 
forfeitures resulting from minor drug offenses); see, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668, 689 (1974) (finding the forfeiture of a lessor’s yacht after a lessee was 
arrested on drug charges to be constitutional despite the lessor not having any knowledge of or 
involvement in the criminal activity). 
 113. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
 114. Id. at 604. 
 115. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996) (“In rem civil forfeiture is a remedial 
civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does 
not constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”), rev’d, United States v. 
$405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, No 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999). 
 116. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993). 
 117. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
 118. Id. at 334. 
 119. Id. at 336. 
 120. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(2) (2012 & Supp. II 2016); see, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 
(stating that “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the 
principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity 
of the offense that it is designed to punish.”). 
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such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.122  
It can be a windfall for local police agencies that often work with limited 
resources.123  However, when numerous state legislatures acted to curb civil 
asset forfeiture, state and local authorities began to engage in a practice known 
as “equitable sharing” to circumvent state regulations.124 
Equitable sharing involves a state or local agency taking property and then 
giving it to federal authorities to institute forfeiture proceedings, which they may 
do if the underlying conduct leading to the forfeiture is a violation of federal 
law.125  The Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice usually 
handle these proceedings.126  If the forfeiture proceedings are successful, then 
the state or local law enforcement agency receives a percentage of the profits 
back from the federal government. 127   While proponents cite improved 
cooperation among state and federal authorities, stiffer federal penalties, and an 
expedited forfeiture process as reasons for equitable sharing, there is an obvious 
financial motivation.128 
When property is transferred to the federal government, CAFRA 2000 holds 
that it must be found forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.129  The 
preponderance of the evidence standard is easier to meet than the standard set 
                                                        
 122. § 983(a) (1)(A)(iv); see Hunter, supra note 24, at 554 (articulating that states “have their 
own respective forfeiture statutes distinct from the federal government’s statute.”); George F. Will, 
When Government is the Looter, WASH. POST. (May 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/opinions/when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/gIQAUIKVZU_story.html (describing 
an example of equitable sharing abuse); John Enders, Forfeiture Law Casts a Shadow on 
Presumption of Innocence: Legal System: Government Uses the Statute to Seize Money and 
Property Believed to be Linked to Narcotics Trafficking. But Critics Say it Short-Circuits the 
Constitution, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-18/local/me-
24209_1_forfeiture-law (observing questionable use of forfeited assets by local law enforcement, 
including a southern sheriff using a forfeited Rolls Royce as his personal vehicle). 
 123. JOHN L. WORRALL, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE: RESPONSE GUIDES SERIES NO. 7: ASSET 
FORFEITURE 2 (2008), http://www.popcenter.org/responses/pdfs/asset_forfeiture.pdf; LEVY, supra 
note 40, at 148–149; see also HYDE, supra note 14, at 36. 
 124. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 23. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ABOUT TREASURY EXEC. OFFICE FOR ASSET 
FORFEITURE, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/The-Executi 
ve-Office-for-Asset-Forfeiture.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2017); Overview Asset Forfeiture 
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/afp (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 127. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2012) (“Whenever property is civilly or criminally 
forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may . . . transfer the property to any federal 
agency or to any state or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or 
forfeiture of the property.”); Williams et al., supra note 57, at 25; Hunter, supra note 24, at 558–
59. 
 128. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 25. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). 
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by many states in forfeiture proceedings.130  This means a successful forfeiture 
and accompanying windfall is more likely at the federal level.131  Given this 
motive, law enforcement agencies frequently choose to conduct forfeiture at the 
federal level rather than at the state level.132  In addition, states often have 
provisions mandating that forfeited assets be distributed for purposes other than 
law enforcement, such as education or the general treasury fund.133  The federal 
government, however, has no such restrictions and mandates that forfeited funds 
be used solely for law enforcement purposes.134  Equitable sharing provides the 
perfect mechanism to circumvent inconvenient state restrictions of civil asset 
forfeiture.135  In bypassing state law, state and local authorities are profiting 
surreptitiously from forfeiture and behaving in a manner inconsistent with 
notions of federalism and due process.136 
L.  The Next Step 
CAFRA 2000’s numerous inadequacies elicited calls for reform that 
ultimately led Rep. Walberg to introduce CAFRA 2014.137  Although the Act 
has bipartisan support, including fifteen Republican and five Democratic 
cosponsors in the House of Representatives, it has now sat idle for over three 
years.138  CAFRA 2014 proposes several important changes to federal civil asset 
forfeiture laws and these revisions are discussed in the following section. 
II.  CAFRA 2014’S IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE 
CAFRA 2014 has seven total provisions and six substantive provisions.139  
The six substantive provisions introduce changes that will affect the following 
areas: notice of potential representation by an attorney, burden of proof, innocent 
                                                        
 130. See Williams et al., supra note 57, at 22 (observing that Kentucky, New York, Oregon, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, 
California, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin all require more than preponderance of the 
evidence). 
 131. Id. at 25. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND 
AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND FY 2014 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 5 (Jan. 
2015) [hereinafter ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND FY 2014 
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1508.pdf# 
page=1 (stating that “[a]ll property and cash transferred to state and local agencies and any income 
generated by this property and cash is to be used for law enforcement purposes”). 
 135. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 26. 
 136. Stuteville, supra note 12, at 1185–86. 
 137. Rulli, supra note 14, at 87; Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th 
Cong. (2014); see also 160 CONG. REC. H7392–01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 138. H.R. 5212 (113th): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5212/details (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 139. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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owner defense, proportionality, increased visibility, and equitable sharing 
agreements.140 
A.  Providing Notice of Legal Assistance 
The first reform proposed by CAFRA 2014 concerns the notice of legal 
assistance requirement.141  The amendment requires the government to provide 
notice to claimants of their potential right to legal representation.142  If property 
owners are informed of the potential right through a required written notice, then 
it is more likely that owners will choose to exercise that right and obtain 
assistance of counsel.  This benefits claimants since many forfeit their assets 
because they cannot afford the expense of contesting the seizure, or otherwise 
do not have the knowledge, expertise, or ability to fight the forfeiture. 143  
Because CAFRA 2014 requires the government to provide helpful information 
to property owners, it is an improvement over CAFRA 2000 and helps to ensure 
that claimants are given adequate notice of their legal rights. 144   Although 
CAFRA 2014 does not address filing deadlines,145 the legal assistance notice 
provision is a step in the right direction. 
B.  Increasing the Burden of Proof 
CAFRA 2014 proposes striking the preponderance of the evidence standard 
in favor of the clear and convincing evidence standard.146  Raising the burden of 
proof to clear and convincing evidence will require the government to present 
more evidence in order to prove that assets are subject to forfeiture.147  Clear and 
convincing evidence does not represent an unreasonable burden for officers to 
meet and can help restore public trust in law enforcement agencies by making it 
                                                        
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. § 1. 
 142. The text of the amendment is the following: “The government shall include in any such 
notice that the person receiving the notice may be able to obtain free or reduced legal representation 
under subsection (b).”  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014); 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)1(A)(i). 
 143. Rulli, supra note 14, at 89; LEVY, supra note 40, at 130–131; Sheth, supra note 22, at 26. 
 144. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 145. See generally id. 
 146. Id. § 3. 
 147. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (stating that the clear and 
convincing standard requires parties to provide evidence that “could place in the ultimate factfinder 
an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’”); compare 
Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining clear and convincing evidence as 
“indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.  This is a greater 
burden than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials”), with id. at Preponderance of 
the Evidence (“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater 
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior 
evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is 
still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”). 
950 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:933 
less likely that innocent people will have their property taken away. 148  
Furthermore, the clear and convincing standard requires less evidence than the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases,149 meaning that 
officers will still need less evidence than what they would normally need for 
criminal convictions.150  Since an owner does not need to be charged with a 
crime to subject his or her assets to forfeiture, there is an innate possibility that 
more innocent people will be drawn into forfeiture proceedings.151  Given this 
dilemma, it seems equitable to raise the burden of proof and thereby make it less 
likely that innocent people will lose their property to unmerited forfeitures.152 
Since one of the overarching principles in civil asset forfeiture is that 
forfeitable property must have been acquired by unlawful means or otherwise 
used to further illegal activity,153 it is reasonable to increase evidentiary burdens 
given the catastrophic impact that unjustified forfeiture has on innocent 
owners.154  One might think that legislators would welcome any reform that 
protects law-abiding citizens from unwarranted seizures; however, there is a 
strong force pushing for evidentiary standards to remain the same.155 
While drafting CAFRA 2000, Rep. Hyde initially advocated for the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, but was unable to muster enough support for that 
                                                        
 148. See Moores, supra note 88, at 784–85 (illustrating the negative public perception of civil 
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and convincing evidence standard, see supra note 146–147. 
 150. See generally Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 
983–86 (1993). 
 151. See United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 795 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(finding currency seized from a traveler to be subject to forfeiture despite never charging him with 
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Losing?, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12 
/taken. 
 152. For some examples of questionable forfeitures that CAFRA 2014 could alleviate, see the 
following: United States v. $48,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 756 F.3d 650, 653–55 (8th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. $10,700.00 in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
$9,230.00 in U.S. Currency, 58 F. Supp. 3d 945, 948 (D. Neb. 2014). 
 153. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983(c); 21 U.S.C. § 881; United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S. 
Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that in order “[t]o successfully effectuate the 
forfeiture of seized currency under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the government must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial connection exists between the seized currency and 
drug activity”). 
 154. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Michael Sallah, & Steven Rich, They Fought the Law. Who Won?, 
WASH. POST. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/08/they-
fought-the-law-who-won/. 
 155. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text. 
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provision.156  Law enforcement agencies and their legislative allies in the Senate 
put up a firm resistance to the higher evidentiary burden, and were able to 
pressure Rep. Hyde into accepting the lower threshold.157  It is not surprising 
that this happened, given that law enforcement agencies have a vested pecuniary 
interest in civil asset forfeiture.158  If the standards are kept lower, then it is easier 
for them to seize valuables that can be appropriated for their own uses.159  
However, raising the evidentiary standard may also benefit law enforcement by 
improving their reputation and restoring public esteem. 
As previously stated, if the burden of proof is increased, then the government 
will have to present more credible evidence to successfully forfeit property.160  
This lessens the likelihood that the government will waste time and resources on 
weaker, circumstantial cases that are more likely to be overturned or dismissed 
on appeal. 161   Conversely, if the government is required to present more 
substantial evidence, then it will be more likely to succeed on the forfeiture cases 
that it decides to prosecute.  As a result, it will be more difficult to undermine 
the government’s position in legitimate forfeiture cases.162 
Law enforcement agencies are concerned with maintaining credibility and 
their public image with the American people.163  Civil asset forfeiture abuse 
undermines trust, making the public uncooperative and discontented.164  Ideally, 
having the government meet rigorous standards prior to seizing property will 
make it appear more even-handed and impartial in the public’s eye.165  With 
                                                        
 156. H.R. REP. NO. 106–192, at 11–12 (1999), reprinted in 199 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 1999 WL 
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 158. HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 14–
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et al., supra note 57, at 20. 
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Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Function, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2008) 
(discussing how damage to a law enforcement agency’s credibility can negatively impact its 
mission and affect its public perception within the American people). 
 164. Moores, supra note 88, at 784–85. 
 165. Id. at 792. 
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reputation in mind, several United States Attorneys General have already 
dabbled with changes to the civil asset forfeiture process.166  If CAFRA 2014 is 
enacted, then police may receive a significant boost in public esteem rather than 
the negative publicity associated with controversial seizures.167 
C.  Innocent Owner Defense 
CAFRA 2014 amends the innocent owner defense, so that the burden of proof 
shifts to the government after the claimant establishes a prima facie case for the 
defense.168  The government would have to prove that the “claimant knew or 
reasonably should have known that the property was involved in the illegal 
conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.”169  This revision represents a positive 
change for property owners because, as the law currently stands, an innocent 
owner is effectively required to prove his or her own innocence.170  It is sensible 
to require the government to prove scienter rather than to make an innocent 
owner prove a negative.171  CAFRA 2014 will relieve property owners of the 
active burden of establishing their own innocence,172 and will allow claimants 
to have the favorable position of rebutting the government’s case rather than 
meeting the burden of proof.173  If enacted, this measure would protect innocent 
owners and eliminate a burdensome and detrimental imposition on claimants.174 
                                                        
 166. Eric Holder took steps to limit cash seizures in structuring cases.  Press Release, U.S. 
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31, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-restricts-use-asset-forfeiture-
structuring-offenses.  Attorney Generals from as far back as the Clinton administration have 
recognized problems within the civil asset forfeiture system and taken steps to correct them.  See 
Barnet, supra note 24, at 104 (observing that former “Attorney General Janet Reno instructed the 
Department of Justice to review and recommend changes to civil forfeiture policies and 
procedures”). 
 167. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
 168. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. § 4 (2014).  Perhaps 
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4. 
 174. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1076–77. 
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D.  Proportionality Considerations 
CAFRA 2014 expands the proportionality requirements into areas such as fair 
market value, the range of available sentences, and “hardship to the property 
owner and dependents.”175  Appellate courts are required to review excessive 
fines arguments—under which many civil asset forfeitures are challenged—at 
the de novo standard. 176   Given CAFRA 2014’s additional proportionality 
factors, courts will be less likely to uphold grossly excessive forfeitures because 
they will have to consider a broader range of proportionality factors.177 
Forfeitures not only pose a severe burden to adult property owners,178 but can 
also impact property holders’ families and children, subjecting them to suffering 
and deprivation without any underlying criminal conviction.179  CAFRA 2014 
will allow courts to consider hardship to these people as a component of whether 
the forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive. 180   Overall, CAFRA 2014’s 
additional proportionality factors represent a positive development for claimants 
because courts will be able to undertake more extensive proportionality analyses 
and be less likely to uphold excessive forfeitures.181 
E.  Clarity and Transparency in Reporting Forfeitures 
CAFRA 2014 attempts to increase accountability and transparency among law 
enforcement agencies that participate in civil asset forfeiture programs.182  It 
proposes an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 524, which establishes the asset 
forfeiture fund.183  The current law under that section calls for an annual report 
documenting the total amount of deposited funds to be issued to Congress and 
made available to the public no more than four months after the end of each 
                                                        
 175. H.R. 5212 § 5. 
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fiscal year. 184   However, CAFRA 2014 proposes a slight, but beneficial 
clarification.185 
The proposed change specifies how forfeiture deposits should be 
documented.186  Rather than simply requiring a report on total deposits, CAFRA 
2014 mandates a report of specific deposits “from each type of forfeiture, and 
specifically identifying which funds were obtained from criminal forfeitures 
versus civil forfeitures.”187  This will allow the public to keep track of the use of 
civil asset forfeiture and gauge the government’s practices and priorities under 
the asset forfeiture system.  Although there is no requirement for law 
enforcement agencies to document how funds are spent,188 the proposed change 
will nonetheless help achieve greater accountability by allowing the public to 
keep track of the prevalence of civil asset forfeiture. 
F.  Curbing Abuse in Equitable Sharing Programs 
CAFRA 2014 implements a statutory bar to federal agencies accepting state 
forfeitures when law enforcement is acting to circumvent forfeiture 
restrictions. 189   Because law enforcement often uses equitable sharing in 
duplicitous ways,190 CAFRA 2014 requires the Attorney General to “assure” 
that equitable sharing is not abused by state authorities.191  If implemented, this 
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2017] The Next Step in Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 955 
provision will restrict the controversial aspects of equitable sharing,192 and help 
restore the public’s faith in an asset forfeiture system that has come under fire 
for abusive practices.193  Apart from benefitting property owners, the change 
will be good for government officers by increasing professional standards and 
restoring their public image.194  This may in turn encourage cooperation with 
law enforcement and boost the government’s credibility.195  Eventually, CAFRA 
2014’s changes will help to restore credibility to agencies that have suffered 
damage to their reputations based on unconscionable or baseless forfeitures.196 
Even the nation’s top law enforcement officials have recognized the need for 
action against equitable sharing abuse.  In January 2015, then Attorney General 
Eric Holder issued a statement prohibiting equitable sharing, except under 
certain public safety circumstances.197  While Attorney General Holder’s policy 
change was a positive step forward, it did not extend beyond his term in office 
and subsequent attorneys general are free to change departmental policy at 
will.198   For example, current Attorney General Jeff Sessions reinstated the 
equitable sharing program, drawing criticism from across the political 
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spectrum.199  To stop the practice from recurring under future administrations, 
CAFRA 2014’s proposed legislation will obligate all future attorney generals to 
assure that federal asset forfeiture programs are not being used to circumvent 
state laws or administrative processes.200 
III.  CONCLUSION 
CAFRA 2014 has the potential to help safeguard property rights and restore 
confidence in a controversial civil asset forfeiture system.  If it passes, the 
increased notice requirements, higher burden of proof, revamped innocent 
owner provision, proportionality considerations, and restrictions on equitable 
sharing would combine to bring additional accountability and due process in an 
area of law that has always been rife with confusion, uncertainty, and abuse.  
While efforts at reform will undoubtedly encounter entrenched resistance from 
law enforcement entities and prosecutors,201 the myriad abuses that have come 
to light in recent years merit significant reform.  Until some meaningful change 
improves the system, Americans will continue to suffer injustice in which their 
livelihood is ripped from their possession by the force of an opaque, but 
powerful, operation of engrained legal fiction. 
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